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Abstract
How to say no less, no more about conditional than what is needed? From
a logical analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions (Section 1), we ar-
gue that a stronger account of conditional can be obtained in two steps:
firstly, by reminding its historical roots inside modal logic and set-theory
(Section 2); secondly, by revising the meaning of logical values, thereby
getting rid of the paradoxes of material implication whilst showing the
bivalent roots of conditional as a speech-act based on affirmations and re-
jections (Section 3). Finally, the two main inference rules for conditional,
viz. Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens, are reassessed through a broader
definition of logical consequence that encompasses both a normal relation
of truth propagation and a weaker relation of falsity non-propagation from
premises to conclusion (Section 3).
Keywords: Bilateralism, Conditional, Connection, Modi, Relevance.
Introduction: Elementary, my dear Wason?
Undergraduate students are currently introduced to logical conditional –or im-
plication1, through an explanation in terms of truth-tables. Hence their sur-
prised faces, when confronted to the truth of a conditional sentence whenever
its antecedent is false. But this logical method is neither the only one nor
the best one. The literature on logical conditional is tremendous and some of
its most famous developments intended to achieve the same purpose as ours,
namely: to give a better definition of logical conditional, by getting rid of its
undesired properties in classical logic.
Among the well-known logical systems which arose in this respect, let us quote
relevant logic and connexive logic [1],[29]. In the former, the notion of relevance
1Strictly speaking, ‘implication’ is valid conditional. But both concepts of implication and
conditional are currently made equivalent in the literature, which is not without some effect
on the general confusion concerning what this logical connective is intended to mean.
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has been made an essential feature of conditional, especially with the pioneer
works of Anderson & Belnap [1] and the semantic development of Routley [19].
These were meant to face with the problem of topic-neutrality: how can an
conditional be said true, whenever the antecedent and the consequent have
nothing in common? In the latter, the properties of consistency and compati-
bility are preconditions for a proper characterization of conditional. We do not
enter into the details of these systems, in the present paper. Although there
is no ideal solution to the logical challenge of relevance, our aim is exactly the
same: to make better sense of implication in a logical system, thereby account-
ing for the intuitive preconditions of relevance and connection between the
antecedent and the consequent. It is in the nature of what makes conditional
both relevance- and connection-friendly that we are going to depart from both
relevantists and connectivists.
Just as the Ramsey’s Test is used to be, Wason’s Four-Card Selection Problem
[30] –better known as the ‘Selection Task Problem’, is another good way to
exemplify what logical conditional is supposed to mean. It consists in applying
a rule stated in the following indicative words: If one card has a D on one
face, then it has a 5 on the other side. Let us symbolize it by an ordered pair
〈D, 5〉, given that the order of appearance matters. The player is supposed to
rely upon this rule in order to make the right choice, after picking the first
card. The rule can be generalized in this logical abstract statement: If ϕ then
ψ, the variables ϕ and ψ standing for any two atomic sentences connected by
our conditional relation “if-then”. Because of its game-liked nature, Wason’s
selection problem assumes that there is good and a bad way of playing the
game of selecting cards.
At least two questions are in order, in this respect. First, how an application
of the above rule is to be checked after selecting the first card. Second, how
many sides need to be checked in order for the player to win the game. Our
answer is that at least two ordered pairs correspond to relevant situations and
need to be checked accordingly: 〈D, ?〉 and 〈7, ?〉. This means that the player
has still a reason to pick a second card only if their first selection concerns the
clause of the rule. Thus, there are two relevant forms of reasoning or inferences
that help to test the validation of the above rule from the first to the second
selection of a card. The first reasoning runs as follows: if (ϕ) The card has
D on one face, then either (ψ) The card has 5 on the other side, or (¬ψ) the
card has 7 on the other side. The first sequence (ϕ)–(ψ) is sound whilst the
second (ϕ)–(¬ψ) is not, because of its violating the basic and unique rule of
the game. The inference behind the first sequence is better known as Modus
(Ponendo) Ponens, i.e., the mode that affirms (by affirming). To apply this
rule of inference consists in inferring the truth of ψ from the truth of ϕ after
stating that ψ follows from ϕ. Let us represent the whole sequence in three
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different forms, viz. literally, syntactically, and semantically.
1. If D, then 5 1. ϕ→ ψ 1. v(ϕ→ ψ) = T
2. Now D 2. ϕ 2. v(ϕ) = T
3. Therefore 5 3. ∴ ψ 3. v(ψ) = T
The second reasoning starts from another initial drawing: if (¬ψ) the card
has 7 on one face, then either (¬ϕ) the card has K on the other side or (ϕ)
the card has D on the other side. Only the first sequence (¬ψ)–(¬ϕ) is sound
and exemplifies the second rule of inference for conditional: Modus (Tollendo)
Tollens, which is the mode that denies (by denying) and consists in avoiding
prohibited cases by inferring the falsity of ψ from the falsity of ϕ.
1. If D, then 5 1. ϕ→ ψ 1. v(ϕ→ ψ) = T
2. Now 7 2. ¬ψ 2. v(ψ) = F
3. Therefore K 3. ∴ ¬ϕ 3. v(¬ϕ) = T
Only these first two sequences are valid modes of reasoning leading to a unique
valid conclusion, whereas the following two ones equally fail. In the third form
of reasoning, (¬ϕ) the card has K on one face and either (ψ) the card has 5
on the other side or (¬ψ) the card has 7 on the other side. No inference rule
is correctly applied in the above two sequences, since none applies the stated
rule about having the pair {D,5}.
1. If D, then 5 1. ϕ→ ψ 1. v(ϕ→ ψ) = T
2. Now K 2. ¬ϕ 2. v(ϕ) = F
3. Therefore 5 or 7 3. ∴ ψ or ¬ψ 3. v(¬ψ) = T or F
In the fourth and last sequence, (ψ) the card has 5 on one face and either (ϕ)
the card has D on the other side or (¬ϕ) the card has K on the other side.
Again, the second drawing card has no relevance because the first drawing has
no effect on the general rule: 5 must be drawn once D has been drawn initially,
whilst no such obligation is applied to the converse sequence 〈5, D〉 of the rule.
1. If D, then 5 1. ϕ→ ψ 1. v(ϕ→ ψ) = T
2. Now 5 2. ψ 2. v(ψ) = T
3. Therefore D or K 3. ∴ ϕ or ¬ϕ 3. v(¬ϕ) = T or F
To summarize the situation, there are three kinds of results in the selection
problem: good, bad, or none (neither good nor bad). We can also express this
threefold distinction with modal properties like right-wrong-none, mandatory-
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prohibited-allowed, or even necessary-impossible-contingent. Whether the rule
is of a deontic, epistemic or alethic nature is not the point of the following. If
so, then let us symbolize the three sorts of drawings by three sorts of emoticons:
satisfied (in symbols: ,), unsatisfied (in symbols: /), and none (in symbols:
–).
letter number
1 D 5 ,
2 D 7 /
3 K 5 –
4 K 7 –
Rescher [17] and, more recently, Pailos & Rosenblatt [13] proposed a non-truth-
functional analysis of what corresponds to the common-language notion of ‘im-
plies’, thus accepting valuations in which there may be more than one output
value. We do not want to follow this non-deterministic way of dealing with im-
plication, however, due to our precise focus on what a truth-value is intended
to mean from our perspective. Anyway, any standard, truth-functional presen-
tation of implication makes no difference between satisfaction and indifference,
as witnessed by the last two columns of the following classical truth-table:
ϕ ψ ϕ→ ψ
1 T T T
2 T F F
3 F T T
4 F T T
There is one clear difference between these two tables: in the second table,
the satisfaction of the rows 3 and 4 embeds the two paradoxes of material (or
‘Philonian’) implication by resulting in unnatural cases of truth; in the first
table, the more pragmatic meaning of the emoticons makes a clear difference
between three sorts of result: satisfied (by truth), dissatisfied (by falsity), and
not satisfied (by either). Where is the right pattern of implication, accordingly?
Our main statement is twofold, namely: that there a crucial logical difference
between satisfaction and dissatisfaction, on the one hand; that the introduction
of a third truth-value cannot explain what is wrong with implication on its
own, on the other hand. A technical proof that any three-valued analysis of
implication turns out to fail has been given by Vidal [24]. But while the latter
favored an analysis in terms of possible-world semantics and strict implication,
our claim is that bilateralism represents an alternative solution to the problem
that surrounds the logical analysis of conditional reasoning, and that a number
of papers in the relevant literature lead one astray about the nature of the
problem.
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1 Necessity and sufficiency
Given that a merely truth-functional depiction of logical implication is mis-
leading, another way to make sense of the latter consists in defining it in terms
of necessary and sufficient conditions.
1.1 Sufficient condition
A sufficient condition is lexicalized by the grammatical conjunction ‘If’ and
is to be expressed by the phrase ‘ψ if ϕ’ in the logical sentence ϕ → ψ. The
sufficient condition is ϕ, viz. the antecedent of a conditional.
However, the meaning of such a sufficiency is unclear and leads to two addi-
tional questions. To the first question: what is sufficient in an conditional, the
answer is: the antecedent, ϕ. To the second question: what ϕ is sufficient for,
the answer is not that easy. On the one hand, the truth of ϕ is not sufficient
in itself for affirming the truth of the consequent ψ, insofar as the truth of ϕ
does not mean that the truth of ψ is thereby implied by it without further
ado. To do this would be committing a big confusion between ‘material’ and
‘formal’ implication, the latter being an implicative form of tautology. On the
other hand, the truth of ϕ is not sufficient for affirming the whole conditional
ϕ → ψ, either, given that ϕ → ψ may be false when ϕ is true –in the special
case when ψ is false.
Another way to account for sufficiency is to equate it with the notion of irrel-
evance, however opposite these may appear on the surface. Indeed: the falsity
of ϕ is ‘sufficient’ for having ϕ → ψ, precisely because of its irrelevance with
respect to its truth; at the same time, the truth of ϕ is not sufficient to ensure
the truth of ϕ→ ψ.
1.2 Necessary condition
A necessary condition, to be read ‘only if’, is said to be the converse of a
sufficient condition: if ϕ is a sufficient condition for ψ, then ψ is a necessary
condition for ϕ and is to be read ‘ϕ only if ψ’.2 The necessary condition plays
the role of consequent in the conditional.
The truth of ψ is necessary for affirming the antecedent ϕ, in the sense that ϕ
cannot be affirmed without affirming ψ at once. The truth of ϕ is not necessary
for affirming the whole implication, however, given that ϕ → ψ may be true
2For an objection to the converse relation between necessary and sufficient conditions,
and a reply to it, see, e.g., [6]. The various arguments mentioned therein rely on subjunctive
conditionals and interpretations of ‘it’ in causal and temporal senses. The present paper is
strictly concerned with indicative conditional, however, for want of sufficient conviction about
a proper logical treatment of counterfactuals.
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while ψ is false (i.e., when ϕ is false, too). Likewise, the concept of relevance
seems a better way to make sense of such a necessity: ψ is necessary in that
its truth is relevant to the truth of ϕ→ ψ whenever ϕ is also true.
In other words, ‘sufficient’ and ‘necessary’ should better be rendered in terms
of ‘irrelevant’ and ‘relevant’ truth-values of a conditional: the falsity of the an-
tecedent is sufficient to ensure the truth of the whole conditional; the truth of
the consequent is necessary to ensure this truth, but only when the antecedent
is already given true. Not only are these explanations not symmetrical with
each other, insofar as the necessary condition requires an additional precondi-
tion for its definition (i.e., that the antecedent be true). But also, the meaning
of such definienda is to be clarified in other terms than mere truth-value as-
signments (as in the below figure).
sufficient condition necessary condition
what? v(ϕ) = F v(ψ) = T
what for? v(ϕ→ ψ) = T v(ϕ→ ψ) = T when v(ϕ) = T
The main problem lies in the fact that the mainstream definition seems to
say more than is intended by a properly implicative relation; the paradoxes
of material implication witness such an over-explanation, especially when the
antecedent is false and turns out to be irrelevant for the truth of the whole
sentence.
2 Inclusion and ordering
True, whoever thinks of logical constants in purely terms of truth-functions
and without intuitive assumptions may contend with the below characteriza-
tion of conditional in the fourth column.
ϕ ψ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
T T T T T T F T T F T F F F F F T F
T F T T T F T T F F F T T F F T F F
F T T T F T T F F T T F T F T F F F
F F T F T T T F T T F F F T F F F F
Now although Quine has been known as one of the most convinced champions
of bivalence, he clearly acknowledged the artificiality of the definition of impli-
cation by means of his truth-function theory:
The mode of composition described in the table constitutes the nearest truth-functional
approximation to the conditional of ordinary discourse.3
3[15]: 15 (our italics).
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Albeit approximatively right, such a definition of conditional remains the cause
of the troublesome paradoxes of material implication. If the problem posed by
any scientific theory is the price to pay for its theoretical simplicity, what of
these paradoxes?
One intuitive characterization of conditional abandons the simplicity of truth-
tables and assumes a set-theoretical reading. It explains the current assimi-
lation of ‘conditional’ and ‘implication’ although, strictly speaking, the latter
corresponds to logical implication: it is a metalinguistic property having to
do with logical consequence. And yet, the Quinean distinction between the
mention of a logical constant in the metalanguage and its use in object lan-
guage cannot ignore the blatant similarity of conditional as mere implication,
implication as logical implication, consequence, and entailment. For this rea-
son, the conditional sentence ‘If ϕ then ψ’ is commonly put on a par with the
set-theoretical definition of entailment as an inclusive relation of containment.
That is, the formula ‘ϕ implies ψ’ means that whatever makes ϕ true also does
this with ψ because the latter is included into the former. Albeit intuitive as
a reading of implication, truth-functionality and topic-neutrality are lost by
doing so: truth-tables cannot be explained in terms of an inclusive relation, on
the one hand; containment assumes that the antecedent and consequent have
something common in their sentential contents, on the other hand.
Nevertheless, the heavy price of paradoxicality motivated the introduction of
modal notions towards a better definition of implication.
For instance, MacColl [12] stated that implication is a sentential relation the
negation of which is impossible (i.e., necessarily false).4 Such a negative def-
inition matches with the classical (ϕ → ψ) =def ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ). Only one half of
MacColl’s definition matches with the classical one, with respect to the truth-
conditions of implication: both antecedent and consequent must be necessarily
true, in which case the conjunction of either and its negation is impossibly true
(i.e., false). But, of course, conjunction and implication are not on a par with
respect to their falsity-conditions: the occurrence of at least one false conjunct
makes conjunction false, whereas the falsity-condition of implication is more
demanding by requiring one true antecedent and one false consequent.
Do the modal notions of necessity and impossibility improve the definition of
implication? Possible world semantics has been especially used for subjunctive
conditionals or counterfactuals, as recalled by Vidal [28]; now such a semantic
device can hardly make better sense of our classical, indicative conditional so
long as ‘worlds’ are not explained themselves.5
4MacColl made use of another symbolism, namely: (A:B) = (AB′)η, which corresponds
to the modern formulation of strict conditional (ϕ J ψ) =def ¬3(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ).
5See especially [9] and [24], by reference to a possible-world semantic treatment of implica-
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And yet, the criterion of inclusion for defining implication was well rendered
by MacColl’s symbolic logic, in the sense that every case of certainty (or neces-
sity) was included there as a special subcase of truth. His negative definition of
implication was motivated by an objection to Schro¨der’s implication, following
which the class of impossibilities was included into the class of necessities. In
this respect, algebraic semantics seems to give a better account by character-
izing implication as an ordering relation between truth-values: ϕ → ψ means
that v(ϕ) ≤ v(ψ). For assuming that truth is greater than falsity in a lattice,
the analogy with integers is such that T and F are currently replaced by 1 and
0 in algebraic semantics: 0 ≤ 1 and, accordingly, any sentence whose truth-
value is lower than or equal with the truth-value of another sentence can play
the role of its antecedent. Hence the validity of valuations like F → ψ and
ϕ→ T as well as the sole invalidity of T → F , for any value of the consequent
ψ and the antecedent ϕ.
However useful this algebraic criterion of ordering may appear, it is still intu-
itively queer and differs from the relation of inclusion. Firstly, the antecedent
has a lower truth-value than the consequent although the latter is supposed to
be conditioned by the former; how can a condition be false, if its proper role
is to make sense of the whole relation between a premise and its conclusion?
Second, paradoxicality is not cancelled by this algebraic trick since, again, the
cases F → ψ and ϕ → T are paradox-makers and stem from abstractly dis-
connected truth-values. The connection, or relevant link, between both terms
is what should be explained by a satisfactory definition of implication.
We argue that the real point of implication is the following: to make impos-
sible the truth of the whole conditional whenever the antecedent is not true,
which is a stronger requirement than MacColl’s modal definition and clearly
discards the undesired case of true implication with a false antecedent. For
that purpose, let us reconsider Frege’s theory of judgment and see what Dum-
mett proposed about the meaning of implication. We take both to be guiding
authors for an intuitively and formally sound solution to our problem, namely:
to afford a definition of conditional, and only that one. Nothing more, and
nothing less than it.
3 Strong conditional
In the following, we propose an alternative logic for two kinds of independent
judgments, namely: affirmation, and denial. Then a corresponding logical
system is devised to improve the definition of conditional without losing the
tions. Moreover, a tricky debate occurred about what “closest” possible worlds are supposed
to mean in order to determine the truth-conditions of counterfactuals.
A 4-valued Logic of Strong Conditional 67
property of compositionality.
3.1 A question-answer game
In his logical considerations, Frege depicted logical reasoning as a sequence of
judgments made by means of sentential contents. Returning to the Fregean
distinction between ‘judgeable content’ (the sense of sentence, i.e., its Proposi-
tion) and judgment (the reference of a sentence, i.e., its truth-value), a sentence
occurs in a language as a form of words endowed with a specific role. The aim
of this sentence is formulated by the initial question of the speaker, as wit-
nessed by Frege in these words:
A propositional question contains a demand that we should either acknowledge the
truth of a thought, or reject it as false.6
In other words, a given sentence ϕ is said to be true whenever the question
asked by a speaker is answered positively by the hearer; otherwise, ϕ is said to
be false and the hearer answers negatively to the same question about whether
ϕ is the case. A corollary of this theory is that falsity is nothing but another
expression of truth through a negative sentence: the truth of ϕ entails the
falsity of its negation ¬ϕ, and this nicely coheres with our linguistic intuitions
concerning negation. But what if a negative answer is first given by the hearer,
i.e., (i) ‘No, ϕ is not true!’? According to Frege, there is no logical difference
at all between this answer and (ii) ‘Yes, ϕ is false!’ or, equivalently, (iii) ‘Yes,
¬ϕ is true!’. We agree with Frege about the latter equivalence between (ii) and
(iii), thereby defining falsity as a by-product of truth and sentential negation:
Falsity. For every sentence ϕ, ϕ is false if and only if its sentential negation
¬ϕ is true.
At the same time, we disagree with him concerning the first alleged equivalence
between (i) and (ii). After all, the answerer can express doubt in giving a
negative answer. Now such a circumstance is overtly discarded by Frege [4],
thereby arguing for his one-sided theory of judgment and the ensuing principle
of bivalence that frames his theory of judgment. In the following, we propose an
alternative logic for two kinds of independent judgments, namely: affirmation,
and denial. An affirmation is an expression of acceptance by the speaker; it is
not only a truth-, but also a falsity-claim and generally means any speech-act
committing the speaker in the truth-value of the sentential content. A denial
is an expression of rejection by the speaker; it may be a merely non-committal
6[4]: 117.
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act expressed by a no-answer; although denying is currently used as a synonym
for a falsity-claim, the latter is just a special case of denial where the speaker
commits in the falsity and does not commit in the truth.
3.2 A logic of acceptance and rejection
An alternative logic for conditional is displayed in the following 4-valued logic
of affirmation and rejection AR4 = 〈L,4, fc, D〉.7 It consists of a sentential
language L; a set of four truth-values 4 = {11,10,01,00} –truth and falsity be-
ing independent from each other; a set of logical connectives fc = {¬,∧,∨,};
and a subset of designated values D = {11, 10}, defining logical consequence
as a relation of truth-preservation. A designated value is whatever assigns the
value of truth to a sentence. Importantly, our illocutionary-minded approach
to logic entails that the truth-value bearers of AR4 are judgments or state-
ments (which are answers to corresponding questions), rather than sentences
(expressed by means of questions). Two sorts of answer correspond to two
sorts of independent judgment in AR4, unlike Frege’s unilateral view of judg-
ment according to which a truth-claim is either an affirmative sentence ϕ or a
negative sentence ¬ϕ.
Letting Q(ϕ) be the sentential question about ϕ, then A(ϕ) is the correspond-
ing answer to whether ϕ is the case, or not. Any yes-answer –or affirmation,
is symbolized by 1; any no-answer –or denial, is symbolized by 0. In order to
make sense of doubt, we need to mark out a relevant difference between deny-
ing truth and affirming falsity; this entails the independence of affirmative and
negative judgments, by contradistinction to Frege’s policy. In the light of our
bilateralist view of judgments as either affirmative or negative, this results in
two main functions in AR4.
The first function is an interrogative function: Q(ϕ) = 〈q1(ϕ),q2(ϕ)〉. It in-
cludes two basic questions:
q1(ϕ): ‘Is it the case that ϕ? (i.e., ‘Is ϕ true?’)
q2(ϕ): ‘Is it the case that ¬ϕ? (i.e., ‘Is ¬ϕ true?’ or, equivalently, ‘Is ϕ false?’)
Again, the second question does not mean the same as ‘Is it not the case that
ϕ?’: the former entails the latter, but the converse does not hold.
The second function is an answerhood function: A(ϕ) = 〈a1(ϕ),a2(ϕ)〉, in
which yes- or no-answers ai(ϕ) 7→ {1, 0} are related to the above two corre-
sponding questions.
7For more details about the philosophical motivations of this system and its connection
with Dunn & Belnap’s logic of First Degree Entailment, FDE, see Schang & Costa-Leite [21].
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Our presentation follows and departs at once from Frege’s philosophy of logic:
it follows his theory of sense and reference, insofar as questions make sense of
a sentential content whilst ordered answers assign truth-values as its reference.
At the same time, our truth-values are not single properties of sentences but
structured answers to sentential questions. The independence of affirmative
and negative judgments leads to four truth-values, which clearly departs from
the bivalent framework of Frege’s logic.
For any value of a sentence ϕ endowed with a logical valueA(ϕ) = 〈a1(ϕ),a2(ϕ)〉,
we have in AR4 the following definitions of negation ¬, conjunction ∧, disjunc-
tion ∨, and a stronger version of implication . Each of the connectives or
binary operators are defined in terms of minimal and maximal functions ∩ and
∪ on single values ai(ϕ).
Negation
A(¬ϕ) = 〈a2(ϕ),a1(ϕ)〉
ϕ ¬ϕ
11 11
10 01
01 10
00 00
Conjunction
A(ϕ ∧ ψ) = 〈a1(ϕ) ∩ a1(ψ),a2(ϕ) ∪ a2(ψ)〉
∧ 11 10 01 00
11 11 11 01 01
10 11 10 01 00
01 01 01 01 01
00 01 00 01 00
Disjunction
A(ϕ ∨ ψ) = 〈a1(ϕ) ∪ a1(ψ),a2(ϕ) ∩ a2(ψ)〉
∨ 11 10 01 00
11 11 10 11 10
10 10 10 10 10
01 11 10 01 00
00 10 10 00 00
Strong conditional
A(ϕ ψ) = 〈a1(ϕ) ∩ a1(ψ),a1(ϕ) ∩ a2(ψ)〉
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 11 10 01 00
11 11 10 01 00
10 11 10 01 00
01 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00
The above matrix shows that an implication can never be affirmed successfully
whenever its antecedent is not so: the whole relation between the antecedent
and the consequence is therefore made irrelevant, doing justice to what Straw-
son argued in [25] about entailment and presupposition. Against Russell’s
logical analysis of negative referential sentences, Strawson argued that such a
sentence as ‘The present king of France is bald’ is neither true nor false when-
ever there is no present king of France. In the same vein, our defective account
of implication is to the effect that the latter is neither told true nor told false
once its antecedent is not affirmed.
Strong conditional matches with classical conditional with respect to its falsity-
conditions only, differing from it with respect to its truth-conditions. Fur-
thermore, our definition of it strengthens implication without making it col-
lapse with conjunction. For both the latter and strong conditional have the
same truth-conditions, i.e., a1(ϕ ∧ ψ) = a1(ϕ  ψ) = a1(ϕ) ∩ a1(ψ). But,
they differ in their falsity-conditions: a2(ϕ ∧ ψ) = a2(ϕ) ∪ a2(ψ), whereas
a2(ϕ ψ) = a1(ϕ) ∩ a2(ψ). Now given that the identity of a logical constant
is provided by these two independent conditions from our bilateral perspective,
the occurrence of two separate judgments is both crucial and useful to make
sense of the related notions of relevance and connection with respect to condi-
tional.
In this respect, strong conditional fulfills some expectations of connexive logic
such as consistency and compatibility. About consistency, Aristotle claimed in
his Prior Analytics (57b14) that
It is impossible that if [ϕ], then not-[ϕ].
Angell [2] called this requirement the ‘conditional principle of non-contradiction’,
which corresponds to the so-called Aristotle’s Theses of connexive logic, ¬(ϕ→
¬ϕ), and ¬(¬ϕ→ ϕ). Strong conditional matches with this, in that it prevents
any antecedent to imply its own negation.
About compatibility, it has been recalled in [29] that, according to Sextus Em-
piricus,
Those who introduce the notion of connection say that a conditional is sound when
the contradictory of its consequent is incompatible with its antecedent.
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Unlike Aristotle’s Theses, connection refers to logical relations between two
different sentences and corresponds to the two Boethian Theses of connexive
logic: (ϕ→ ψ)→ ¬(ϕ→ ¬ψ), and (ϕ→ ¬ψ)→ ¬(ϕ→ ψ). It turns out that
Aristotle’s and Boethius’ theses are partly satisfied into AR4 by invalidating
any conditional of the form Φ  Ψ whose antecedent Φ is false. At the same
time, the theses of connexive logics demand more by requiring the validity
of their negative form ¬(Φ  Ψ). This cannot work in AR4 insofar as the
negation of a neither-true-nor-false sentence does not turn into something true.
In this sense, the so-called ‘theses’ of connexive logic are statements whose re-
quirements about consistency and compatibility are taken into account in AR4
without being ‘theses’ in the logical sense of being true in every model. Even if
such a technical requirement can be satisfied by our strong conditional mutatis
mutandis 8, our point is that some misunderstanding may occur between the
syntactic and semantic readings of connexive logic. From a deflationist point
of view, sentences like ϕ and ¬ϕ are made on a par with the idea that ϕ is
true or ϕ is false, respectively. If so, then the theses of connexive logics are
not valid in AR4; and yet, the views that no falsity can be derived from a
truth and no truth can be derived from a falsity are satisfied by the truth- and
falsity-conditions of strong conditional.
With respect to the case of false antecedents, our definition of implication
intends to give a proper formal version of what Quine took to be a proper
informal reading of conditionality:
An affirmation of the form ‘If p then q’ is commonly felt less as an affirmation of a
conditional than as a conditional affirmation of the consequent. If, after we have made
such an affirmation, the antecedent turns out to be true, then we consider ourselves
committed to the consequent, and are ready to acknowledge error if it proves false. If
on the other hand the antecedent turns out to have been false, our conditional affir-
mation is as if it had never been made.9
Here is an ensuing list of strikingly valid formulas (1)-(9) and invalid formulas
(10)-(17) in AR4:
(1) ϕ |= ¬¬ϕ, (2) ϕ ∧ ψ |= ϕ
(3) ϕ |= ϕ ∨ ψ, (4) ϕ,ϕ ψ |= ψ
(5) ϕ ψ,ψ  γ |= ϕ γ
(6.1) ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) |= ¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ, (6.2) ¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ |= ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)
8See Schang, F. “4-valued strong connexivity” (draft).
9[16]: 21.
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(7.1) ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) |= ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ, (7.2) ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ |= ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)
(8) ϕ ψ |= ϕ, (9) ϕ ψ |= ψ
(10) ¬¬ϕ 6|= ϕ, (11) ψ 6|= ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ
(12) ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ 6|= ψ, (13) ϕ ∨ ψ,¬ψ 6|= ¬ϕ
(14) ϕ ψ 6|= ¬ψ  ¬ϕ, (15) ϕ 6|= ψ  ϕ
(16) ¬ϕ 6|= ϕ ψ, (17) ϕ 6|= ψ  ψ
As there is no tautology in AR4, the classical inference rules are maintained
only if material implication is replaced by the metalogical implication |= from
premises to conclusion. For example, the law of double negation elimination is
validated in its form (1) and invalidated in its form (9). Excluded middle ϕ∨¬ϕ
is shown invalid in (11), through the failure of the Principle of Implosion; a
similar result occurs in (12) with respect to the invalidity of non-contradiction
¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ), thereby showing the paracomplete and paraconsistent nature of
AR4. At the same time, the intuitive properties of conjunction, disjunction
and conditional hold in (2)-(5), including the rule of Modus Ponens in (4), and
the Morganian behavior of negation in AR4 is marked by the formulas (6)-(7).
Although the failure of Modus Tollens occurs in (14), the Section 3.4 will pro-
pose another formulation of it to preserve its logical significance for want of
its validity. The same account can be done with respect to the valid formulas
(8)-(9),10 following which the truth of strong conditional entails the separate
truth of both the antecedent and the consequent. Although these disconnected
truths seem to contradict the expected connection from antecedent and con-
sequent, the strengthened truth-condition of strong conditional may motivate
this point together with our largest definition of logical consequence, according
to which preserving truth is not the only way to define logical constants –the
connection between antecedent and consequent actually occurs whenever the
consequent is false, as will shown later on. Finally, the usually counterintuitive
features of implication are made invalid in AR4, as witnessed by the formulas
(15)-(17).
The above formulas are taken to be intuitive features of conditional, in
the sense that they do justice to the underlying relation of implication from
antecedent to consequent. Are they really so, and to what extent does strong
conditional represent a more ‘natural’ account of conditional?
3.3 ‘Natural’ implication
To recapitulate the situation thus far, we have introduced 4-valuedness in or-
der to improve the definition of conditional in a pragmatic sense of connection
10I am grateful to Peter Verde´e for this note about the seemingly “irrelevant” validity of
(8)-(9).
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between speech-acts. Now our central problem is to catch what is to be meant
by a ‘natural’ definition of implication. Tomova [26] directly tackled this prob-
lem by proposing a set of four conditions for naturalness within three-valued
systems. Thus, an implication → is said to be ‘natural’ whenever:
1. Its restrictions to the subset of truth-values {T,F} coincide with the classical
valuations of implication.
2. If ϕ → ψ ∈ D and ϕ ∈ D, then ψ ∈ D, i.e. matrices for implication verify
Modus Ponens.
3. Assuming v(ϕ) ≤ v(ψ), then ϕ→ ψ ∈ D.
4. ϕ→ ψ /∈ D, in other cases.
Only the second condition is satisfied by strong conditional  in AR4. The
first condition is not satisfied once the antecedent is not affirmed, i.e. when-
ever a1(ϕ) = 0 in A(ϕ ψ); unlike classical valuation, the whole implication
is then neither true nor false in such a case, and we have taken this to be a
precondition of a proper implication. The third condition appears to be an
unnatural clause for implication in most of the algebraic systems, including
the implicative twist-structure proposed by Rivieccio [18]. If the only reason
to satisfy this third condition is to make an algebraic difference between the
definitions of implication and conjunction, then AR4 does suffice for this pur-
pose whilst avoiding the ensuing paradox of material implication.
Is our strong conditional not properly natural for all? To the contrary, it seems
that the above conditions lead to paradoxical valuations and do not avoid those
overcome by . In order to give a natural definition of ϕ  ψ, we take the
following three conditions to be essential between ϕ and ψ, namely: compat-
ibility, connection, and ordering. Compatibility is expressed in AR4 by the
falsity-condition of implication, such that any failure of compatibility results
in a case of falsity. Connection is rendered by the truth-condition, such that
any failure of connection results in a weaker case of non-truth. Ordering corre-
sponds to the relevant feature that makes implication false, given that having
a true antecedent and a false consequent is not the same as having a false
antecedent and a true consequent. Having these three preconditions seems to
be a better way of having a ‘natural’ implication than accepting paradoxes, at
any rate.
Moreover, the validity of (MP) with strong conditional goes together with the
validity of Deduction Theorem (DT):
(DT) Γ, ϕ |= ψ iff Γ |= ϕ ψ
Such a property of equating semantic consequence with the validity of con-
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ditional still holds in AR4, due to the clause of validity included into (DT):
if a strong conditional ϕ  ψ is valid then it can be turned into a semantic
consequence ϕ |= ψ, and conversely. That strong conditional invalidates any
formula including a false antecedent does not infringe (DT), accordingly, given
that conditionals with false antecedents are ruled out by the above clause of
validity. And yet, another problem remains with our stronger implication. It
concerns the link between inference and validity, especially with respect to the
definition of Modus Tollens. Given that the latter is an essential feature of
implication, AR4 should be refined in order to overcome the following other
objection to strong implication.
3.4 Logical meaning beyond validity
The combination of bilateralism and many-valuedness gives rise to a more com-
prehensive theory of judgments and a more intuitive definition of conditional.
However, there may be cons about its characterization. Not only is the inter-
definition between conditional, conjunction and disjunction, lost: the formulas
¬ϕ ∨ ψ and ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) are no more logically equivalent with ϕ  ψ in AR4.
But also, and more importantly, the property of Modus Tollens (MT) seems
also to be lost by our stronger version of conditional:
(MT) ϕ ψ,¬ψ |= ¬ϕ
If the above consequence relation did hold, then the truth of the two premises
ϕ  ψ and ¬ψ would entail the truth of the conclusion ¬ϕ. But it cannot
be so in AR4: if, e.g., A(ϕ) = A(ψ) = 10, the first premise ϕ  ψ is true
whilst the second ψ is not. The only way for the latter to be also true is then
to have A(ψ) = 11. Then the valuations A(ϕ) = 10,A(ψ) = 11 make the
premise true, but the resulting conclusion A(¬ψ) = 01 makes (MT) invalid.
The situation is even worse with a bivalentist, who discards our non-standard
values 00 and 11 from the outset. End of the game, accordingly?
We do not think so, because we assume a definition of logic that does not reduce
itself to a list of rules making formulas valid. Moroever, there is no tautology
in AR4 since there is no statement ϕ in AR4 such that the speaker would
be sure to tell the truth by affirming it. This crucially depends upon his own
speech-acts, depending upon whether (s)he affirms or denies some components
in ϕ. More generally, our point is that logic is not just a question of validity.
Rather, the meaning of a logical constant is afforded by a game with different
moves and several purposes, and the search for winning strategies is only but
one among different ways of playing a game. This is obviously reminiscent of
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dialogical logic [10] and Hintikka’s Game-Theoretical Semantics [7]; but, our
algebraic 4-valued semantics wants to insist on the four valuations to show the
way in which the speech-acts of affirmation and denial may redefine inference
rules beyond the sole game of validity as truth-preservation. So let us explain
how this game makes sense of strong conditional in particular.
Telling the truth is the major aim of logic, and the meaning of a logical constant
consists in describing the ways to achieve it. Hence our present question: how
to tell the truth with a conditional? The problem with classical logic is that
the conditions to win this game of truth-telling are not sufficiently stringent:
there are too many ways of winning the game classically, so that the inference
rules for conditional have to be refined.
Now what if the speaker is not in position to tell the truth, for want of sufficient
evidence for, say, the antecedent of a conditional? From a unilateralist view of
judgment, whoever does not tell something true is thereby led to say something
false. This argument can be used against our 4-valued characterization of log-
ical constants in AR4, if non-truth comes to be reduced to a non-designated
value and, hence, to logical falsity. This is too a reductive, black-and-white pic-
ture of the game: a speaker who does not affirm the antecedent of a conditional
should be put ‘off the game’, as suggested by Dummett [3] in his comparison
of implication as a bet. Therefore, matrices are not a sufficient way to afford
the meaning of a logical constant; while these can characterize strategies to
tell the truth, the following wants to show that (MT) does not concern such
winning strategies.
Some game-theoretical considerations may help to clarify the use of some con-
cepts like truth and falsity, or assertion and rejection. Showing the truth of a
sentence is winning the game of logic; showing its falsity is defeating an Op-
ponent, thereby winning in an indirect way. Otherwise, the game ends with a
draw: rejection has the last word, for want of conclusive assertion for or against
the thesis.
We may even attempt some comparisons with another game: football [20].
Thus, the values assigned to ϕ,ψ are single moves intended to reach a final
attitude about the value of ϕ ◦ ψ (where ◦ is any binary logical constant): as-
sertion is an offensive move, whether affirmative or negative; weak rejection is a
defensive move, whereas strong rejection is an attack on its own. The defective
feature of conditional has to do with offside position: when the antecedent is
not affirmed the situation is as if the team action has been aborted, borrowing
from Quine’s preceding account on what conditional means informally.
Being offside does not enable to win the game of truth-telling, as the case turns
out to be with the looser truth-conditions of classical implication. But it does
not make lose one, either: a bivalent reading would present offside as a situa-
tion leading to a sanction like own-goal, assuming that any move is either to
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score or to be scored in the end. As for the case in which the speaker rejects the
truth of the consequent, the situation is more awkward since the player does
not stand ‘off’ the game by doing so: (s)he can lose it, in case (s)he then affirms
the truth of the antecedent. Truth counts above all, admittedly: in football,
the best way not to lose is to score more goals than the opposite team in order
to win the match; but also, a defensive strategy can be viewed as a comple-
mentary strategy in order not to be scored, that is, not to lose the match. We
can compare assertions with an offensive strategy, that of scoring goals. Now
an assertion can be affirmative (a1(ϕ) = 1), or negative (a2(ϕ) = 1). In the
latter case, the search for falsity-claims might appear contrary to the logical
purpose of preserving truth, just as it may seem irrational for a football team
to play by intending to score own goals. And yet, we can even imagine such
queer games in which moves that help to win in one game are moves that make
one lose in another version of this game. Rather than losing a game, (MT)
can be viewed as a rule that helps not to lose by playing logic in a reasoning
including conditional.
By extension, we can redefine the following four medieval modes of judgment
(M1)-(M4) in the light of our bilateralist theory. The classical versions are the
Fregean-minded readings where denial was systematically rendered as the af-
firmation of a sentential negation, that is, as a strong rejection; they have been
replaced here below by the weaker reading of denial as a mere no-answer, es-
pecially in (M2): the stronger version unduly states that the conclusion holds,
according to our account of (MT) as a non-losing inference rule.
More generally, let ◦ be one of the binary operators of AR4. Then each of the
Modi ...do Ponens are inference rules used as winning or affirmative strate-
gies, by affirming something in order not to satisfy the wanted truth-conditions
a1(ϕ ◦ ψ); and each of the Modi ...do Tollens are inference rules used as non-
losing or negative strategies, by denying something in order not to satisfy the
unwanted falsity-conditions a2(ϕ ◦ψ). In every such case, a ‘Mode that X-s by
Y-ing’ is a mode where the speaker performs the speech-act X in the conclusion
after performing the speech-act Y in the second premise.
(M1) Modus Ponendo Ponens (‘Mode that affirms by affirming’)
If a conditional is affirmed together with its antecedent, then its consequent is
affirmed.
1. a1(ϕ ψ) = 1
2. a1(ϕ) = 1
3. a1(ψ) = 1 (by a1(ϕ ψ))
(M2) Modus Tollendo Tollens (‘Mode that denies by denying’)
If a conditional is affirmed and its consequent is denied, then its antecedent is
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also denied.
1. a1(ϕ ψ) = 1
2. a1(ψ) = 0
3. a1(ϕ) = 0 (by a2(ϕ ψ))
(M3) Modus Ponendo Tollens (‘Mode that denies by affirming’)
If the conjunction is denied and one of its conjuncts is affirmed, then its other
conjunct is denied.
1. a1(ϕ ∧ ψ) = 0
2. a1(ϕ) = 1
3. a1(ψ) = 0 (by a2(ϕ ∧ ψ))
(M4) Modus Tollendo Ponens (‘Mode that affirms by denying’)
If a disjunction is affirmed and one of its disjuncts is denied, then the other
conjunct is affirmed.
1. a1(ϕ ∨ ψ) = 1
2. a1(ϕ) = 0
3. a1(ψ) = 1 (by a1(ϕ ∨ ψ))
By means of this extended, both game-theoretical and algebraic description of
logic, we are also in position to reconsider one of the trickiest troubles around
the definition of conditional, namely: the well-known Frege-Geach Problem.
3.5 The Frege-Geach Problem
We do not want to enter in depth into the philosophical debate between cog-
nitivism and expressivism. But we cannot beg it out, insofar as it directly
concerns our illocutionary definition of implication.
In a nutshell, expressivists take sentences to express mental states, whilst cog-
nitivists do not. An objection made by cognitivists to the expressivists is that
their interpretation of normative sentences should hold in every context of dis-
course, including conditional statements. But assuming that the components
of a sentence are discharged from any commitment by the speaker, their ex-
planation should fail. Applying this problem to our illocutionary treatment
of logic as a game of statements (Frege’s judgments) rather than mere sen-
tences (Frege’s judgeable contents), our analysis of conditional should equally
fail because we, as the expressivists, treat judgments as the primary vehicles
of meaning.11 But if so, then our account should break down once the speaker
11A standard example of normative sentence, to exemplify the debate around the Frege-
Geach Problem, is something like ‘X is good’ rather than ’ϕ is true’. But, our illocutionary
approach to logic equally means that speakers do commit themselves by making speech-acts.
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does not commit in the truth or falsity of the components ϕ and ψ in ϕ ψ.
Our reply to this problem is that not every judgment is committal upon the
sentential content, albeit committal upon the logical behavior of the speaker.
Take the act of denial: a bilateralist view of judgments makes the latter dif-
ferent from negative assertion, thereby showing that (MT) can be explained
as a combination of assertion and denial in its inferential process. To be more
precise, by denying a sentential content the speaker does refuse to claim either
is being true or false. Searle defined denial with this weak sense of rejection in
mind:
If F is a sign indicating performance of a certain speech act, then the effect of ‘not’
on that sign is to produce a new sign which indicates (but does not state) that the
original speech act is under consideration but the speaker is not yet prepared to accept
the commitments involved in performing it.12
But there is still a problem with Modus Ponens (MP):
(MP) ϕ ψ,ϕ |= ψ
since the Frege-Geach Problem equally concerns the commitment of speakers
in (MP) and (MT). According to us, the complete meaning of a logical constant
is not given by its valid but, rather, relevant inferences; irrelevant truths do
not matter, as the paradoxes of material implication are, and an inference is
said to be relevant if it contributes to fulfill the speaker’s purpose. Now there
are at least two problems with bilateralism. For one thing, one can affirm a
whole implication without affirming anything about either of its components.
Frege [5] noticed it to make the difference between a whole implication thought
and its components in the process of inference:
Of course we cannot infer anything from a false thought: but the false thought may be
part of a true thought, from which something can be inferred. The thought contained
in ‘If the accused was in Rome at the time at the deed, he did not commit the murder’
may be acknowledged to be true by someone who does not know if the accused was in
Rome at the time of the deed nor if he committed the murder. Of the two component
thoughts contained in the whole, neither the antecedent nor the consequent is being
12[23]: 58 (our italics); also cited in [6]: 107. The italicized passage helps to make an
essential difference between non- committal judgments (questions with no positive answer, in
AR4) and plain non-judgments (no question at all, in AR4): whoever entertains a sentential
content may refuse to assign any truth-value to it; but by doing so, he does something after
all by denying this content. This case of denial is that overtly neglected by the Fregean theory
of judgment; it can be viewed as a sort of ‘non-committal commitment’, just as inaction is
said to be a voluntary action of doing nothing once performed knowingly.
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uttered assertively when the whole is presented as true. We then have only a single
judgment, but three thoughts, viz. the whole thought, the antecedent, and the conse-
quent.13
Frege also made use of this explanation to disqualify the relevance of properly
negative judgments. For if no particular judgment is made inside an implica-
tion, then denial can be reduced to an expression of sentential negation. We
agree about the non-committal use of antecedent and consequent, whenever
the speaker ‘does not know enough’ to affirm anything about their truth or fal-
sity. And yet, we disagree with Frege in two respects: on his first assumption
that any judgment is a committal speech-act, given our account of denial as a
non-committal speech-act; on his second assumption that negative judgment
has no relevant role to play in the game of logic.
Let us review the two kinds of conditional inference quoted by Frege [4]. In
the first one,
(a) If the accused was in Rome at the time of the deed, he did not commit the
murder. He was in Rome at this time. Therefore he did not commit the crime.
(MP) is performed by means of an affirmative antecedent ϕ and a negative
consequent ψ. The three-part inferential process can be reconstructed in AR4
as follows:
1. If ϕ, then ¬ψ 1. v(ϕ ¬ψ) = T 1. a1(ϕ ¬ψ) = 1
2. ϕ 2. v(ϕ) = T 2. a1(ϕ) = 1
3. ∴ ¬ψ 3. v(¬ψ) = T 3. a1(¬ψ) = 1
The second example is an instance of (MT), where the second premise related
to the consequent rather than the antecedent:
(b) If the accused was in Rome at the time of the deed, he did not commit the
murder. He did commit the murder. Therefore he was not in Rome at this time.
1. If ϕ, then ¬ψ 1. v(ϕ ¬ψ) = T 1. a1(ϕ ¬ψ) = 1
2. ψ 2. v(¬ψ) = F 2. a2(¬ψ) = 1
3. ∴ ϕ 3. v(ϕ) = F 3. a2(ϕ) = 1
A serious problem seems to arise with (MT) for our illocutionary account of log-
ical constants: how can our speaker affirm the first two sentences consistently,
13[4]: 119-120.
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given our strengthened truth-conditions of conditional? For if the speaker can
affirm a strong conditional only by affirming its two components, as the case is
with the truth-conditions of conjunction, then our speaker seems condemned
to affirm and reject at once the consequent ¬ψ in the two premises. Our reply
to this objection is that it stems from a deep misunderstanding about what a
conditional assertion should really mean: whoever asserts the truth of an im-
plication in AR4 does not thereby assert its two components; rather, whoever
does that means that the truth of either component is connected to the truth
of the other. Now the relevance of their connected truth does not go on a par
with their actual truth.
For one thing, Dummett [3] endorsed Quine’s view on implication by compar-
ing the assignment of truth-values with a bet: the latter can be aborted because
there may be a gap between the winning of a bet and the losing of it, as with a con-
ditional bet.
Dummett similarly claimed that an implication is ‘neither true nor false’ when-
ever affirming the truth of the antecedent is not in the speaker’s power. Hence
the ensuing gap between truth and falsity, that is, between winning and losing
in a bet, in the sense that
to determine what is to involve one of these is not yet to determine completely what
is to involve the other”.14
Such a gap is betrayed by the contrary relationship between the truth- and
falsity-conditions of our stronger conditional: there are circumstances in which
the whole statement is neither true nor false, unlike the other logical constants
of disjunction and conjunction which always led to the complementary result
of winning or losing statements.
And yet, Dummett went on saying that there are two possible interpretations
of conditional:
There is a distinction between a conditional bet and a bet on a truth of a material
conditional; if the antecedent is unfulfilled, in the first case the bet is off –it is just as
if no bet had been made –but in the second case the bet is won.15
Vanderveken [27] corroborates Dummett’s view on the twofold reading of im-
plication:
14[3]: 8-9.
15[3]: 8.
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As Dummett pointed out, the different is striking in the case of a conditional bet of
the form ‘If A then I bet 5$ that B’ and of a bet of the form ‘I bet 5$ that if A then
B’. In the first case, if the antecedent is false, there is no winner no loser, but in the
second case there is always a winner and a loser when the bet is accepted, since the
conditional expression is either true or false in the world of the utterance.16
Despite our great sympathy for Vanderveken’s illocutionary logic, we clearly
disagree with the above Dummettian distinction between two uses of condi-
tional. Borrowing from the symbolism of Searle [23], let F (ϕ) be the logical
form of any speech-act where F is an illocutionary force attached to a sen-
tential content. Let assertion and rejection be two such forces.17 Then what
Vanderveken means here above is that ‘bet on a conditional’ and ‘conditional
bet’ differ: the former has the logical form ϕ  F (ψ), whereas the second is
F (ϕ  ψ). According to the author, the latter always comes to a winning
case: the gambler wins whenever ϕ is false or ψ is true, and he loses only if
ϕ is true and ψ is false. In other words, Vanderveken sticks to the truth- and
falsity-conditions of material implication inside the illocutionary force F . We
do not. After all, what difference in use is there between betting in both cases
whenever the antecedent is false?
The situation can be also compared with what  Lukasiewicz [11] said about the
necessity of syllogisms, whether in an absolute or relative sense of the word.
Just as with Frege’s above examples, a syllogism is made of two premises lead-
ing to a conclusion. A conclusion is said to be relatively necessary if the truth
of the conclusion depends upon that of the premises. By analogy with bet-
ting, Vanderveken seems to say that there is a logical difference between the
expressions ‘If the premises are true, then the conclusion is necessarily true’
and ‘Necessarily, if the premises are true then so is the conclusion’. We do not
see any logical difference in these whenever premises are not true, just as we do
not equate our bilateralist redefinition of implication with a case of absolute
necessity.
Actually, our bilateralist definition of conditional would better be compared
with the property of modal distribution over conditional in the modal K-
system.18 What is the meaning of 2(ϕ  ψ) |= (2ϕ  2ψ)? In terms of
possible-world semantics, this inferential property means that, assuming that
a given implication is true in every possible world, then the alleged truth of
the antecedent in every possible world entails the same situation for the con-
sequent. Compare 2 with F , or with assertion. Thus, our strengthened condi-
16[24]: 25.
17About the objections to the status of illocutionary negation, or rejection, see, e.g., [5].
18About this analogy between the distributions of assertion and necessity, see [22].
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tional means that every situation in which the conditional is asserted is such
that an assertion of the antecedent entails an assertion of the consequent. Ad-
mittedly, this does not preclude some situation in which the antecedent would
be rejected, and the game cannot be won in such a case. But this does not
alter anything in our definition of the success-conditions of conditional, i.e., its
truth- or, better, truth-telling conditions by the speaker.
Actually, the second inference (b) given by Frege [4] can be read in a twofold
relative sense of ‘conditionality’. In the first reading (b1), the speaker commits
in the falsity of the consequent according to the second premise. This is the
strong version of rejection, as depicted by the following pattern:
(b1) If the accused was in Rome at the time of the deed, he did not commit the
murder. He did commit the murder. Therefore he was not in Rome at this time.
1. If ϕ, then ¬ψ 1. v(ϕ ¬ψ) = T 1. a1(ϕ ¬ψ) = 1
2. ψ 2. v(ψ) = T 2. a1(ψ) = 1
3. ∴ ¬ϕ 3. v(¬ϕ) = T 3. a1(ϕ) = 1
In the second premise, the speaker commits in the falsity of the consequent
¬ψ by affirming the truth of ψ; therefore, (s)he cannot reject this consequent
without also rejecting the antecedent ϕ, under the penalty of accepting the
falsity of his own initial thesis. Therefore, the speaker rejects ϕ in order not
to lose the game. At the same time, has he won by doing so? We do not think
so, due to our strengthened definition of conditional which admits of only one
way of winning the game (i.e., telling the truth) with a conditional sentence.
There is still a second, weaker version of (b2) where the speaker does not know
anything about whether the consequent is the case or not:
(b2) If the accused was in Rome at the time of the deed, he did not commit
the murder. I do not say that he did not commit the murder. Therefore I do
no say that he was in Rome at this time.
1. If ϕ, then ¬ψ 1. v(ϕ ¬ψ) = T 1. a1(ϕ ¬ψ) = 1
2. not ¬ψ 2. v(¬ψ) 6= T 2. a1(¬ψ) = 0
3. ∴ not ¬ϕ 3. v(¬ϕ) 6= T 3. a1(ϕ) = 0
Illocutionary negation, or rejection, is brought out in (b2) by the verbal expres-
sion ‘I do not say that’, unlike the shorter and committal internal negation ‘not’
occurring in (b1). In AR4, the difference between locutionary and illocutionary
negation is a difference between the sentential operator ¬ and the statemen-
tal or judicative no-answer 0. The logical relation between the stronger and
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weaker versions of rejection is a relation of species and genus: whoever asserts
the falsity of a sentence thereby rejects it, whereas the converse need not hold.
It does not hold in the above sample (b2), but the logical result of the two in-
ferences (b1)–(b2) is the same: loss is avoided by rejecting the conditions under
which it would obtain.
Finally, note that Frege never referred to irrelevant situations in his exempli-
fication of (MP) and (MT), i.e., cases where the second premise corresponds
to a false antecedent or a true consequent. Far from condemning the relevance
of negative judgments, this passage of Frege [4] enabled to show the unavoid-
able connection between conditional and inference, and to recall our dialogical
view of conditional in terms of relevant moves motivated by two complemen-
tary strategies: winning the game by obeying the rule (MP), if the speaker
is entitled to affirm what he needs for this purpose; not losing the game by
obeying the rule (MT), as far as the speaker can avoid any situation in which
the falsity-conditions of his (her) thesis would obtain.
Conclusion: Elementary, my dear Wason!
We proposed a strengthened version of conditional, and the result has been de-
fended by means of an algebraic and game-theoretical account of logic. Apart
a probabilistic or non-compositional approach, we presented conditional as an
illocutionary operation between two possible speech-acts: assertion, or rejec-
tion. Boolean logic has been presupposed throughout the paper, using the two
basic values 1 and 0 to express the yes- and no-answers of affirmation and
denial. At the same time, our logical system AR4 is many-valued by making
use of truth-values as structured and ordered answers to sentential questions.
By doing so, we did justice to Frege’s theory of judgment in his depiction of
logic as a game of scientific investigation. But we departed from him by as-
signing a crucial role to a bilateralist theory of judgment: the independence
of assertion and rejection helps to give a sound definition of implication, both
endorsing the necessary condition and discarding the sufficient conditions af-
forded by the classical or material implication.
In conclusion, the two main properties of conditional have been redefined
through a more comprehensive view of logic. Just as Wason alluded to with
his selection problem, conditional is closely related to rules about obligatory
or forbidden actions in a game: (MP) says what is obligatory to do in order to
win the game ; (MT) says what is forbidden to do, i.e., what is obligatory to
do in order not to lose the game.
All of this cannot be made obvious, so long as logic is reduced to the one-sided
activity of winning or telling the truth. Being a good logician is not just an
affair of winning a game; it is also a question of acting rationally and taking
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the right decision in any given situation. Some of these decisions can be ir-
relevant, as in a card game or a football match. If so, they cannot pave the
way to a winning strategy. This truth is very trivial or elementary, assuming a
bilateralist view of logic and the logical independence of two basic speech-acts:
assertion, and rejection.
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